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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
In addition to the issues stated by Home, implicit 
therein, and addressed in Home's appeal brief, are the following: 
1. Whether the covenant not to compete in the employment 
contract between Home and Lewis is void for failure of 
consideration. 
2. Whether Home is guilty of bad faith; and, therefore, 
is not entitled to enforcement of the covenant not to compete, 
3. Whether the covenant not to compete in the employment 
contract between Lewis and Home contains unreasonable time and 
area restrictions. 
4. Whether the anti-competitive provisions of the 
contract between Lewis and Home violate public policy. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Home Abstract and Title Company, Ogden, Utah, brought an 
action against Michael V. Lewis, a former employee of Home 
Abstract and Title Company, to enforce the provisions of a 
covenant not to compete in an employment contract between Lewis 
and Home Abstract. 
Other than discovery, there were no pretrial proceedings 
in the District Court, and the matter was tried to the Honorable 
Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding Judge of the Second Judicial District 
Court, on October 31, 1984. At the trial, the defendant, 
Michael V. Lewis, and the principals of Home Abstract and Title 
Company, including Franklin S. Maughan, Sr., its President, 
Franklin S. Maughan, Jr., Russell Maughan, and Richard Maughan, 
testified and introduced documentary evidence. Trial memoranda 
were submitted to the Court by both parties. 
Judge Hyde issued his Memorandum Decision in favor of 
Lewis on November 28, 1984, and executed a Judgment of Dismissal, 
together with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent 
with said Memorandum Decision on December 20, 1984. 
Home Abstract and Title Company filed its Notice of 
Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court with the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for Weber County on January 16, 1985. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Home Abstract and Title Company, 
Inc. ("Home")
 f is a Utah corporation authorized to and doing 
business in the State of Utah. Defendant and Respondent, Michael 
V. Lewis ("Lewis") is a former employee of Home and is currently 
employed by Associated Title Company, in Ogden, Utah. The 
corporate officers and directors of Home include Franklin D. 
Maughan, Sr., H. Randall Hillyard, Richard T. Maughan, Franklin D. 
Maughan, Jr. and Russell C. Maughan, who are also full time 
employees of Home. 
On or about March 1, 1976, Lewis became employed by 
Home. While Lewis had no prior experience working for a title 
company, he quickly learned the basic skills involved in title 
work. Approximately three months after his employment with Home, 
Lewis was presented with an employment contract, the terms of 
which are the subject matter of this litigation. Lewis executed 
the contract, which was backdated to March 1, 1976. (APP. "A" to 
Home's Brief). 
Among other things, the contract provided that Lewis was 
presently employed in the abstract business by Home and that "both 
parties are desirous of continuing the said employment, on the 
same terms as exist presently." The contract further provided 
that Lewis agreed "not to engage, on the termination for any cause 
whatever p.f. [sic] his employment hereunder, in the same or 
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similar line of business as that now carried on by [Home Abstract] 
or engage to work for any individual firm or corporation engaged 
in such line or similar line of business in Weber, Davis, Morgan 
or Box Elder Counties within a period of Five years from the time 
the employment under this contract ceases," Notwithstanding 
Home's statement of facts in its Brief, there is nothing in the 
contract or the transcript reference "which guaranteed [Lewis] 
employement for a year." 
The contract contains no provision for injunctive relief, 
either preliminary or final, or for damages in the event of a 
breach by Lewis. 
Just prior to Lewis1 employment with Home, another 
employee, one Frank Hammond, having signed an agreement identical 
to the one signed by Lewis, voluntarily terminated his employment 
with Home and immediately went into direct competition with Home 
in Weber County, Neither Home, nor any of its officers or 
directors ever sought to enforce that covenant despite Hammond's 
direct competition with Home. In addition, Home, in its Brief, 
suggests that the Frank Hammond incident was an isolated incident 
and/or an exception to the policy of Home with reference to 
enforcement of the noncompete provisions of the employment 
contract. The evidence taken at trial, however, clearly shows 
that the Frank Hammond incident not only evidenced a policy of 
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selective enforcement; but was, indeed, consistent with Home's 
policy of selective enforcement. 
When Franklin D. Maughan, Sr. was asked, "Do you have a 
policy of enforcement of these employment contracts . . .?", 
Mr. Maughan responded, "Depending on the circumstances." (Emphasis 
added.) In response to a follow-up question regarding enforcement 
of the contract, Franklin D. Maughan, Sr. said, "So we assess each 
case separately, and if we, in our judgment, think that it's 
proper not to enforce it, we don't." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. p. 
72). Mr. Maughan then went on to identify some of the factors 
taken into consideration by Home in determining whether to enforce 
the provisions of the contract, such as the effect on Home's 
business, "human elements", reasons for a person leaving and 
starting their own business, and efforts to disrupt office force. 
(Tr p. 73) . The evidence also suggests that Home determined to 
enforce the terms of the contract against Lewis because of a 
dispute that arose between Lewis and Home over vacation pay which 
was ultimately resolved in favor of Lewis by the Industrial 
Commission. (Tr. Pp. 78-79). 
Further, although there was some uncertainty with 
reference to Russ Maughan, the testimony of Home's witnesses at 
the trial revealed that most, if not all, of the Maughans, who are 
officers, directors and employees of Home, did not sign an 
employment agreement, even though their competing with Home for 
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another employer or otherwise constituted a much greater threat to 
the well-being of Home than anything Lewis could do. (Tr. Pp. 
90-91). 
While employed by Home, Lewis fulfilled all of his 
obligations under the contract; and, in addition to performing 
title work, Lewis, together with other officers, directors and 
employees of Home was encouraged to socialize with existing and 
potential customers. To that end, Lewis was given an expense 
account, and expended the sum of $796.71 the calendar year next 
prior to his termination entertaining existing and potential 
customers of Home. (Tr. Pp. 14, 15, Home's Trial Ex. 3). Home's 
fact statement in its Brief would suggest to the court that 
Lewis's primary responsibilities as an employee of Home involved 
the creation and maintenance of Home's goodwill. That assertion 
is very simply not supported by the evidence. 
Although it is not clear just exactly at what point 
during his employment Lewis began spending more time than some 
other employees of Home taking customers to lunch, it _is_ clear 
that all of the employees of Home Abstract Company were charged 
with the responsibility of entertaining clients and building 
goodwill. (Tr. Pp. 35, 36, 104, 105). It is equally clear that 
there is absolutely no evidence that Lewis was hired for the 
purpose of engaging in any sort of "public relations" work. 
Indeed, Lewis, right up to the time of his termination, was 
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involved in fulfilling his primary responsibilities to Home as an 
abstractor. (Tr. p. 172, See also Tr. p. 82). In this regard, a 
closer examination of Home's Exhibit 3 covering the calendar year 
next prior to Lewis' termination is in order. (Home's trial 
Exhibit 3 is attached hereto as Respondent's Appendix 1). 
According to that Exhibit, and as hereinbefore stated, Lewis spent 
the sum of $769.71 entertaining customers of Home. The Exhibit 
further reveals that that sum was expended on only 35 separate 
occasions during the year, apparently involving the purchase of a 
meal. Thus, Home's Exhibit 3 (Appendix 1 hereto) shows that Lewis 
made customer contacts and expended funds for the purpose of 
entertaining customers only a little more than once every two 
weeks. Notwithstanding Home's assertions on page 7 of its Brief 
with reference to the time consummed by Lewis, there does not 
appear to be anything on page 14 of the Transcript standing for 
that proposition. 
While it is obvious from the foregoing analysis that 
Home's trial Exhibit 3 hardly supports the proposition that Home's 
goodwill depended exclusively upon the efforts of Lewis, the 
testimony of Franklin S. Maughan, Sr., President of Home, reveals 
that the goodwill of Home depended a great deal upon the 
"considerable reputation" of Mr. Maughan and the other officers 
and employees of Home. (Tr. p. 49). In that regard, Mr. Maughan 
further testified that Home was the largest title company in the 
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Ogden area employing over 50 percent of all of the registered 
abstracters in Ogden and that business actually improved 
subsequent to Lewis' departure. (Tr. Pp. 51, 52). Mr. Maughan 
agreed that Associated Title would have picked up business in the 
Ogden area whether or not Lewis had been employed by Associated 
(Tr. Pp. 56-57), that major customers of Home typically spread 
their business among all title companies (Tr. p. 57), and that 
factors such as geographic proximity between the customer and 
title company, rotation and replacement of customers1 personnel, 
and other business relationships between the customer and title 
company such as lessor-lessee, or bank depositor, are all factors 
which determine whether or not a customer will place an order with 
any given title company. (Tr. Pp. 48, 57). Finally, Mr. Maughan 
testified that Home has absolutely no commitment of any sort from 
any of its customers providing that those customers will deal 
exclusively with Home or any other title company. (Tr. p. 57). 
Most compelling, however, is Mr. Maughan's testimony on 
p. 58 of the trial transcript, 
Q. So as Mr. Browning said then in his opening 
remarks, we are not in a position to determine 
whether or not an order that was placed with 
Associated by one of Home's customers was the 
same order that Home otherwise would have gotten 
from that customer? There is no way to determine 
that; is there? 
A. That's right. 
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Q. And that's why Mr, Browning in his opening 
remarks is talking about things like threatening 
harm, and that sort of thing, because there is 
just no way to tell that the orders currently 
being serviced by Associated would otherwise have 
been placed with Home Abstract? 
A. That's right. 
Mr. Maughan further testified at p. 59 of the trial transcript, 
Q. there's no way to establish the fact 
that there were less orders that may have been 
the result of economic fluctuations, other 
business relationships, you know, where you have 
your checking account or who you happen to lease 
from? There's no way to establish that if you 
got one or two less orders from First Security in 
any given month, that that was because of the 
presence of Associated Title? 
A. I guess that's fair. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Maughan's testimony, Home's brief 
places great emphasis upon the information contained in Home's 
Exhibit 1, portions of which are attached hereto as Respondent's 
Appendix 2. Home's Exhibit 1 consists of numerous sheets of raw 
data compiled by Home showing recording activity at the Weber 
County Recorder's Office by the major title companies in the area 
for the major customers of those title companies, together with a 
summary of the raw data for March, April, May and June, 1983, for 
Home, and March, April and June, 1984, for Home and Associated 
Title. As can be seen from the portion of the Exhibit summarizing 
the raw data, Home enjoyed 22 percent of the "business" as 
reflected by the County Recorder's records in March of 1983, the 
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month that Lewis resigned. Home's share of the "business" in 
April of 1983 increased to 28 percent and 35 percent in the months 
of May and June of 1983. It is interesting to note at this point, 
that Home did not present the Court with any information regarding 
the percentage of the "business" enjoyed by Associated for the 
months of April, May and June, 1983, although the portion of 
Home's Exhibit 1 containing the applicable raw data shows that as 
early as March, 1983, Associated had a 2 percent share of the 
"business". 
In 1984, according to the Exhibit, Home enjoyed 22 
percent of the "business" in March, 24.6 percent in April, and 22 
percent in June, while Associated enjoyed eight percent of the 
"business" in March, six percent in April, and six percent in 
June. For some reason, Home presented no information for the 
month of May, 1984. 
Perhaps most compelling, however, is that portion of 
Exhibit 1 to which Home makes no reference in its Brief showing 
that in July, 1984, the share of the "business" enjoyed by Home 
had risen to 32 percent, even as the Exhibit graphically 
illustrated that Associated's miniscule share had declined prior 
thereto. 
During the last year of his employment with Home, Lewis 
was advised by Russ Maughan, a personal friend, that he would be 
wise to seek employment elsewhere because of difficult business 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conditions and the return of other members of the Maughan family 
to the company, (Tr. p. 107). Lewis received similar advice from 
other sources. (Tr. p. 148). Subsequent thereto, Lewis was 
contacted by Associated Title Company ("Associated") and offered a 
position. Although Associated had previously maintained an office 
in Roy, Utah, as well as other areas of the state, and had a large 
number of statewide contacts with various major lending 
institutions, its office in Ogden opened roughly contemporaneous 
with Lewis1 employment in the Spring of 1983. (Tr. p. 47). 
Lewis believed that Home would not seek to enforce the 
covenant not to compete based on Home's history of selective 
enforcement, the fact that more important employees may or may not 
have signed a similar contract, and the fact that he had been 
advised to seek work elsewhere. Lewis also believed the covenant 
not to compete was unreasonable with reference to geography and 
time, and, therefore, was unenforceable. (Tr. Pp. 142-148). 
Upon termination, Lewis took with him no customer lists, 
no trade secrets, no documentation whatsoever, but only the 
general knowledge and skills he acquired doing basic title 
research which he acquired while working for Home. Indeed, there 
are no trade secrets in the title business and customers for the 
services of a title company in any given area are common 
knowledge. (Tr. p. 61). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The appeal of Home Abstract and Title Company from the 
decision of the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde to the Utah Supreme Court 
is little more than a general challenge to the findings of Judge 
Hyde, upon which Judge Hyde determined that the noncompete 
covenant in an employment agreement between Home and Michael V. 
Lewis against Lewis was unenforceable against Lewis. 
Lewis1 arguments primarily address the evidentiary basis 
for the findings and the legal effect thereof; together with legal 
points implicit in the issues as stated by Home Abstract in its 
appeal brief. 
Based upon the findings of the trial court, the instant 
case is clearly and unequivocably distinguishable from the fact 
situations that existed in the leading Utah cases of Allen v. Rose 
Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951), and System Concepts, Inc. 
v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983), both heavily relied upon by 
Home Abstract. 
Thus, when the principles set out in Allen and System 
Concepts are applied to the facts of the instant case, Home 
Abstract is clearly not entitled to the relief sought. 
The findings of the trial court which clearly distinguish 
the instant case from the cases relied upon by Home Abstract are 
supported by the weight of the evidence, and, in addition, the 
noncompete covenant of the employment contract that Home Abstract 
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is seeking to enforce against Lewis is not enforceable by 
injunction, is void for failure of consideration, is not 
enforceable because of Home Abstract's bad faith, contains 
unreasonable area and time restrictions and violates public policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NOTHING SPECIAL, UNIQUE OR 
EXTRAORDINARY ABOUT LEWIS1 DUTIES 
AS AN EMPLOYEE OF HOME. 
In order for a covenant not to compete to be enforceable 
against a former employee by his former employer, the services 
rendered by the employee must be special, unique or 
extraordinary. System Concepts v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). 
In System Concepts, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded a trial court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief. 
The action involved a suit by System Concepts, a company engaged 
in the manufacture and sale of sophisticated cable television 
equipment, against defendant Dixon, System Concepts1 former 
national sales manager, to enforce a covenant not to compete 
contained in a "proprietary information agreement" entered into by 
the parties for the purpose of protecting the company's goodwill 
and preventing competitors "from acquiring, appropriating or 
discovering the distinctive characteristics and design features of 
the company's products and to maintain a protective competitive 
advantage of its products in the industry." The restrictive 
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provision at issue in the agreement prohibited the defendant from 
rendering certain types of services to competitors within two 
years from the date of termination of her employment with System 
Concepts. The agreement also provided that System Concepts1 
rights under the agreement would be enforceable by injunction in 
the event of a breach by Dixon. 
Defendant Dixon voluntarily terminated her employment 
with System Concepts approximately three years later, and accepted 
employment with MetroData, a competitor of System Concepts in the 
production of cable television equipment. Her position with 
MetroData was that of National Sales Manager, just as it had been 
with System Concepts. Thus, as a representative of MetroData, 
Dixon was required to contact the same customers as she did as an 
agent for System Concepts. System Concepts brought suit and 
immediately sought preliminary injunctive relief. In reversing and 
remanding the trial court's denial of preliminary injunctive 
relief, the Utah Supreme Court noted with particularity the extent 
to which System Concepts substantially developed its goodwill 
through the defendant in her capacity as National Sales Manager. 
Not only was the defendant's name, picture, and role as National 
Sales Manager promoted extensively through advertising media in 
connection with the company's products, but she also had become 
intimately involved with the operational design, specification and 
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technical development of a number of System Concepts' products. 
She also had access to proprietary information. 
Although not specifically addressed in the System 
Concepts case, the issue of whether an employee's services are 
"special, unique or extraordinary" requires a two pronged 
analysis. In order for the noncompete agreement to be enforced, 
do the services rendered by the employee have to be special, 
unique or extraordinary only to the employer; or do the services 
rendered by the employee have to be special, unique or 
extraordinary in the broader sense, to the extent that those 
services would be special, unique or extraordinary to any 
potential employer or competitor? Because of the nature of System 
Concepts' business, together with the intimate involvement therein 
by Dixon, it would appear that the Utah Supreme Court is focusing 
upon the concept of "special, unique or extraordinary" in the 
broader or absolutest sense (although the concept could be adapted 
to a circumstance such as that confronting the Court in Allen v. 
Rosepark Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951), where, for all 
practical purposes, the departing employee was the business) . 
In the instant case, Home does not even contend that 
Lewis' duties as an abstracter were "special, unique or 
extraordinary". Instead, Home's case focuses exclusively upon the 
so-called "public relations" responsibilities that Lewis, together 
with each and every other employee of Home had; although Lewis and 
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Russell Maughan engaged in somewhat more "public relations" 
activity than other general employees. 
Although no specific authority could be located bearing 
on the general proposition that taking customers to lunch or 
dinner 35 times each year involves in and of itself a special, 
unique or extraordinary function, common sense dictates that 
taking a customer to lunch or dinner can hardly be considered a 
special, unique or extraordinary function in and of itself. 
Nor can taking a customer to lunch or dinner 35 times 
over a calendar year be considered special, unique or 
extraordinary in the context of Home Abstract's business where all 
14 employees, officers and directors of Home Abstract were charged 
with a "public relations" function, and Lewis' activities resulted 
in the modest expenditure of $796.71. 
It is equally obvious that the instant case is a far cry 
from the circumstances that existed either in System Concepts or 
Allen. First, the instant case does not involve trade secrets on 
the part of Home that might be considered worthy of protection. 
Second, the services rendered by Lewis were not special, unique or 
extraordinary. Third, the covenant between Lewis and Home was a 
broad restraint against competition, rather than a narrowly drawn 
restraint tied to special, unique or extraordinary abilities or 
skills of the defendant, as was the covenant in System Concepts. 
Fourth, Lewis had no knowledge of highly techical products, as was 
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true of defendant Dixon in System Concepts, nor did Lewis have any 
involvement in design specifications or access to proprietary 
information, as did Dixon. Fifth, in System Concepts, the Court 
placed some emphasis on the fact that the departing employee had 
no alternative but to contact the very same customers whom she had 
contacted on behalf of System Concepts. Obviously, in the instant 
case, there are many customers for the services of a title 
insurance company other than those currently served by Home, and 
the customers served by Home typically place business with all 
other title companies in the area. Sixth, Lewis1 name was not 
placed before the public with the same intensity as was Dixon's in 
System Concepts, nor was Lewis entirely or substantially 
responsible for the goodwill of Home, as was the case with Dixon, 
the National Sales Manager in System Concepts and the pharmacist 
in Allen. Indeed, in both of those cases, for different reasons, 
the departing employee was the only contact the employer had with 
customers. Finally, it is important to note that the contract 
between Home and Lewis does not provide that the same may be 
enforced by injunction, as was the case in System Concepts. 
Defendant Lewis's position as a general abstracter for 
Home is more closely analagous to the "common calling" occupied by 
the salesman in Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982). In 
Robbins, the court held that although Finlay "was a sophisticated 
sales person, well versed and knowledgeable in the occupation 
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which he pursued," the covenant not to compete was unenforceable, 
because, among other things, his services were "[not] special, 
unique, or extraordinary, even if their value to this employer was 
high." Robbins, 645 P.2d at 627 and 628. The court noted: 
The case is clearly distinguishable from Allen v. 
Rose Park Pharmacy, supra, where a covenant not 
to compete was enforced because all the goodwill 
of the employer was associated with, and created 
by, the employee. In this case, the covenant 
serves no purpose other than restricting an 
employee from competing with a former employer. 
There is nothing to indicate that Finlay was 
largely responsible for plaintiff's goodwill, and 
there is no contention or proof that Finlay was 
privy to any trade secrets plaintiff may have 
possessed. Nor is there any indication that his 
competition (except for the use of the customer 
leads) had any greater effect on plaintitf's 
goodwill, or other legally protectable interests, 
than the competition of any other salesman 
employed by a competitor of plaintiff. 
Robbins, at 627-28. 
Finally, both Robbins and System Concepts can fairly be 
read to require not only that the employee's services be "special, 
unique or extraordinary," but also, that the language of the 
contract itself, be restrained by limitations keyed to uniqueness 
of the employee's services, trade secrets, confidentiality, or 
even competitive unfairness. Robbins, 645 P.2d at 628; see, also, 
System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 424. 
Of course, the limitations in the contract between Home 
and Lewis are in no way tied to any elements of uniqueness of 
Lewis' skills, services, or tied to trade secrets or otherwise. 
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Indeed, the covenant in the instant case sounds indictingly 
similar to the covenant involved in Robbins, 645 P.2d at 624-25, 
as well as the covenant quoted therein from Columbia Ribbon, 
infra, 369 N.E.2d at t>, ao an example of a broad, sweeping 
covenant that "baldly restrains competition." Robbins, 645 P. 2d 
at 628. 
The broad sweeping language in Lewis1 contract can in no 
way be said to measure up to the specificity of the "proprietary 
information agreement" signed by defendant Dixon in System 
Concepts and which was narrowly tailored to protect only 
legitimate interests of System Concepts. The agreement there, as 
executed, was for the purpose of preventing competitors from 
"acquiring, appropriating or discovering the distinctive 
characteristics and design features of the company's products and 
to maintain and protect the competitive advantage of its products 
in the industry." Among the restrictive provisions of the 
agreement was an "anticompetition covenant" which prohibited 
employees from rendering certain types of services to competitors 
(defined in the agreement as "conflicting organizations") within 
two years from the date of termination of their employment with 
System Concepts. System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 424. Thus, the 
noncompetition covenant in System Concepts was tied directly to 
the special, unique, and extraordinary aspects of the services 
rendered by defendant Dixon which included "management of sales 
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activities and customer referral on a national level, extensive 
personal promotions in advertising media, products development and 
design consultation, development of sales methods and general 
promotion of products." System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 426 n.ll. 
The covenant also protected System Concept's products. Finally, 
in certain circumstances the "proprietary information agreement" 
allowed defendant Dixon to work for competing organizations. 
Brief for Appellant at 14, System Concepts, 669 P.2d 421. The 
covenant not to compete signed by Lewis is not narrowly tailored 
to protect only legitimate interests of Home, but rather, is 
nothing more than broad restraint against competition; and, even 
if Home had demonstrated that Lewis' services may have had a high 
value to Home Abstract, that is simply not enough. Robbins, 645 
P.2d at 628. 
POINT II 
LEWIS TOOK WITH HIM ONLY THE GENERAL SKILLS THAT 
HE GAINED DURING THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYEMENT 
WITH HOME AND HOME'S GOODWILL STAYED WITH HOME 
AFTER LEWIS' DEPARTURE AND WAS NOT DEPENDENT UPON 
LEWIS' EMPLOYMENT. 
Based upon an examination of Home's Brief, it is readily 
apparent that it is relying almost exclusively upon Lewis' 
testimony to the effect that he did, indeed, contribute to the 
goodwill of Home. 
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Home put on no evidence whatsoever even remotely relating 
to the quantum of goodwill generated by other employeesf officers 
and directors of Home nor made any sort of effort to quantify the 
goodwill allegedly "taken" by Lewis. 
In addition, Home totally ignores the testimony of 
Franklin S. Maughan, Sr., Home's President, to the effect that the 
goodwill of Home depended a great deal upon other people and other 
factors having nothing to do with Lewis, such as the fact that 
Home's business actually increased subsequent to Lewis' departure? 
that there is absolutely no way to determine whether an order 
serviced by Associated would otherwise have been serviced by Home; 
the size, reputation and longevity of Home itself; the fact that, 
because of its prior operations in Weber County and Salt Lake City 
connections, Associated Title would have served customers in the 
Ogden area from its Ogden office whether or not Lewis had been 
employed thereby, that there are many factors which determine 
whether or not a customer may use one title company or another; 
and that customers of a title company have no commitments of any 
sort to any particular title company. 
Most compelling, however, is the raw data contained in 
Home's trial Exhibit 1 which graphically illustrates that, 
subsequent to Lewis' departure, Home has been doing very well 
indeed, to the point where, in July, 1984, some three months prior 
to the trial of the instant case, Home's share ot the "business" 
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in the Weber County area equalled approximately 32 percent, 
compared to 22 percent at the time of Lewis' departure. The 
Exhibit speaks for itself with reference to the number of orders 
processed by Home during the periods represented. 
Thus, while there is no question that Lewis, together 
with all of the other officers, directors and employees of Home 
contributed to Home's goodwill, it is readily apparent from the 
testimony of Franklin S. Maughan, Sr., President of Home, together 
with the documentary evidence, that Lewis, quite literally, "took" 
no measurable goodwill with him when he departed; and that the 
goodwill of Home remained with Home. 
Finally, as more specifically analyzed in Point I herein, 
the System Concepts and Allen cases involve facts so radically 
different than those in this case, that they have, for all 
practical purposes, no applicability hereto. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF NO MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
HOME'S SHARE OF THE TITLE BUSINESS AND LACK OF 
INJURY TO HOME BY LEWIS' EMPLOYMENT BY A 
COMPETING COMPANY ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
As pointed out herein in Point II, supra, Home, in its 
Brief, continues to ignore the clear and unequivocal testimony of 
Franklin S. Maughan, Sr., President of Home, relative to the 
ability of Home to demonstrate damage had occurred by Lewis' 
departure and employment with a competing company. (See Lewis' 
Statement of Facts, Pp. 7-8, supra). 
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Also, Home continues to focus upon the fact that Lewis1 
company, Associated Title Company, was doing little or no business 
in the Weber County area prior to Lewis1 employment therewith. 
This position, obviously, begs the question, since Associated had 
no recent presence in the Weber County area except contemporaneous 
with Lewis1 employment therewith. Also, as hereinbefore set out, 
there is no question that Associated Title, because of its 
statewide contacts, was already servicing many potential customers 
who had a presence in Weber County and would have given much of 
their business to Associated in Weber County whether Lewis had 
been employed by Associated or not. 
Of course, as hereinbefore discussed, the information set 
out in Home's trial Exhibit 1 simply does not stand for the 
proposition urged upon the Court by Home; and, instead, supports 
the findings and conclusions of the trial court. 
POINT IV 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT RELATIVE TO HOME'S 
SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE NONCOMPETE COVENANT 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
In its Brief, Home persists in its effort to suggest to 
the Court that the "Frank Hammond incident" was an isolated 
incident when, in fact, the incident graphically demonstrated the 
selective enforcement policy of Home. 
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Again, Home chooses to ignore the clear and unequivocal 
testimony of Franklin S. Maughan, Sr. , Home's President, wherein 
Mr • Maughan not only testified that enforcement (and, indeed, 
execution) of the employment contract was selective, but discussed 
many of the factors considered by Home in determining whether or 
not enforcement would be pursued. (See Statement of Facts, Pp. 
3-5, supra). 
It is also interesting to note that the employment 
contract, Appendix A to Home's Brief, contains no language 
whatsoever to the effect that failure to enforce the terms of the 
agreement does not constitute a waiver of any prior or subsequent 
determination to enforce. 
POINT V 
HOME IS NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
The specific grounds upon which an injunction may be 
granted are set forth in Rule 64A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which states: 
An injunction may be granted: 
(1) When it appears by the pleadings on 
file that a party is entitled to the relief 
demanded, and such relief or any part thereof 
consists in restraining the commission or 
continuance of some act complained of, either for 
a limited period or perpetually; 
(2) When it appears from the pleadings or 
by affidavit that the commission or continuance 
of some act during the litigation would produce 
great or irreparable injury to the party seeking 
injunctive relief; 
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(3) When it appears during the litigation 
that either party is doing or threatens, or is 
about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be 
done some act in violation of the rights of 
another party respecting the subject matter of 
the action, and tending to render the judgment 
ineffectual; 
(4) In all other cases where an injunction 
would be proper in equity. 
This case is not governed by the System Concepts1 
analysis of Rule 65A(e) since this case was not concerned with the 
issue of entitlement to temporary injunctive relief, as was the 
situation in System Concepts. As the authorities cited in System 
Concepts indicate, the question of temporary injunctive relief 
involves different considerations than does the matter of final 
injunctive relief. Although the Utah Supreme Court determined in 
System Concepts that a party need only show probable entitlement 
to relief and threatened irreparable injury in order to obtain 
preliminary injunctive relief, the Court in n ni( purported to 
modify Rule 65A(e) with respect to final injunctive relief, which 
requires that a party seeking relief "is entitled to the relief 
demanded", (Emphasis added). 
The authorities cited by the Utah Supreme Court in System 
Concepts draw distinctions between preliminary and final 
injunctive relief in support of allowing the plaintiff in System 
Concepts to get by on a showing of probable entitlement to relief, 
the Supreme Court cited 2 Moore's Federal Practice, 1MI 65.04(1), 
65.04(4). Paragraph 65.04(4) reads in part: 
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At a hearing on application for a temporary 
injunction it is not necessary to establish to a 
certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to 
relief on the merits, but rather that his success 
is probable. A plaintiff putting on his case for 
temporary relief may hold back evidence, or 
indeed his case may not be fully developed. 
Thus, it is important to know that when he puts 
on his evidence he is having his final day in 
court. 
Indeed, the Appellant's brief in System Concepts points out at 
page 11, "Time constraints on a hearing on a motion for 
preliminary injunction may preclude a full, final hearing on the 
merits." That brief further notes the protection of security 
granted one against whom a preliminary injunction is issued. 
Appellant's brief at 11, System Concepts, 669 P.2G 421. The 
instant case does not involve a determination of whether Home 
should be granted temporary injunctive relief in order to protect 
its rights until such time as a full, final hearing on the merits 
can be had; rather, this case involved a final hearing on the 
merits at least 19 months after Lewis departed. Having had ample 
time to prepare its case, Home now asserts that probable 
entitlement to relief should be the standard. Nevertheless, as 
the foregoing analysis indicates, Home's claim that the 
restrictive covenant is enforceable should fail even under the 
relaxed "probable entitlement" standard. 
The same rationale applies to the second and "most 
important element of Rule 65A(e)", that of irreparable harm. 
System Concepts relaxed the irreparable harm standard with respect 
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to temporary injunctive relief, requiring only a showing of 
threatened harm, and the irreparability thereof, rather than a 
showing of actual, irreparable harm. Again, if this Court were to 
apply the relaxed standard used in System Concepts, it would 
seriously deride the inherent distinctions between temporary 
injunctive relief and final injunctive relief after a full hearing 
on the merits. In fact, Home had sufficient time and opportunity 
to prepare its case, with available, ample records; and Home 
cannot now be permitted to complain of a conjectured, threatened 
injury when it can show no actual injury occurred during the 19 
months that had lapsed between Lewis1 departure from Home and the 
trial. 
In System Concepts, the Utah Supreme Court cited Columbia 
College of Music and School of Dramatic Art v. Thunberg, 116 P.2d 
280 (Wash, 1911), as support for the proposition that a party 
seeking temporary injunctive relief need not show actual injury. 
The language of Thunberg supports such a proposition. Again, 
however, the procedural context ol the case (a motion for 
non-suit) suggests that the case was more closely analogous to a 
pretrial hearing for temporary injunctive relief, rather than 
final injunctive relief, and therefore, should not be extended in 
its application to reach cases involving the latter. The 
Washington Supreme Court in Thunberg reversed and remanded the 
decision of the trial court granting a motion for non-suit. 
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POINT VI 
THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE IS 
VOID FOR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. 
While there is little question that an offer of continued 
employment may sometimes be adequate consideration for an 
employee's submission to the terms of a covenant not to compete, 
that offer of continued employment must be accompanied by a 
sufficient change in the terms of the agreement or an alteration 
of the employee's status such that the court may find sufficient 
consideration on the part of the employer to support the covenant, 
above and beyond the terms already agreed upon. 
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from System 
Concepts and Allen in this regard. In each of those cases, the 
court found that, although the employees signed the contracts 
after commencement of employment, sufficient consideration existed 
to support the covenant not to compete. Of significance in each 
of those cases is the fact that changes in the employee's status 
or benefits accompanied the employee's signing of the new contract 
containing the restrictive covenant. 
In System Concepts, defendant Dixon was promoted to 
National Sales Manager and was given a substantial increase in 
salary. Thus, System Concepts was not unreasonable in requiring 
Dixon to sign the "proprietary information agreement" in light of 
the increased exposure as a result of her new responsibilities to 
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her employer as National Sales Manager and her access to highly 
technical and proprietary information regarding the complex 
products sold by System Concepts, 
In Allen the pharmacist worked for the employer four to 
five weeks before going on payroll, after which he worked 
approximately one more month before executing the written contract 
which provided for his weekly salary plus a bonus of 10 percent of 
the net profits to be credited to a stock purchase option also 
provided for in the contract. Although the issue <»£ consideration 
was raised, it was framed in terms of mutuality of obligation, 
rather than whether additional consideration was required at the 
time of signing the contract in light of the previous employment 
relationship in order to support of restrictive covenant. In any 
event, the court most likely would have found sufficient 
consideration for the covenant in view of the bonus and stock 
purchase option provided for in the written contract had the issue 
been considered in Allen. 
The written contract entered into between Home Abstract 
and Lewis some three months after Lewis commenced work under an 
oral agreement contemplated no change in employee status, gave 
Lewis no additional compensation or benefits, but added only the 
covenant not to compete. 
Among other things, the pertinent portion of the contract 
entered into between Lewis and Home provides: 
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. . • whereas party of the second part [Lewis] is 
presently employed in the abstract business of 
the party of the first part [Home] , in Ogden 
City, Utah, and both parties are desirous of 
continuing the said employment on the same terms 
as exist presently, to make more certain of the 
terms of said employment, the parties hereto 
agree that the terms of said employment are as 
follows: 
7. This agreement constitutes and expresses 
the whole agreement of said parties hereto in 
reference to any employment of second party by 
first party and in reference to any of the 
matters or things herein provided for or herein 
before discussed or mentioned in reference to 
such employment, all promises, representations 
and understandings relative thereto being herein 
merged. (Emphasis added). 
The contract between Home Abstract and Lewis expressly 
states that it is merely continuing the same terms as then existed 
between the parties. The only additional obligation imposed on 
either party as a result of the agreement, is the covenant not to 
compete. No new consideration for such a covenant is found on the 
face of the agreement. The parties agreed that the contract 
between them constituted and expressed the whole agreement between 
the parties. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the precise 
issue raised by defendant Lewis in Maintenance Specialties, Inc. 
v. Gottus, 314 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1974). In Gottus, the court in 
finding a restrictive covenant unenforceable held that when a 
covenant not to compete is executed subsequent to the initial 
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employment, it will not be enforced unless the restricted employee 
receives a corresponding benefit or change of status. Without 
such change of status, the new contract fails not only because it 
is not "ancillary" to the taking of employment, but also because 
of lack of consideration to support the additional covenant of the 
employee. 
Gottus represented a fact situation almost identical to 
that found in the instant case. Defendant Gottus entered into an 
oral employment contract in 1968 and therafter, in April, 1969, 
entered into a written employment contract without altering the 
terms of the oral contract with the exception, ot course, of the 
restrictive covenant. 
The case of Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment 
Corp. , 235 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1967), cited and distinguished by the 
court in Gottus, bears out the distinctions raised by Lewis in the 
instant case and System Concepts and Allen. An employee in 
Jacobson had been hired under an oral contract in 1957 which 
provided for a $10,000 salary and contained no restrictive 
covenant. In 1959 the employee signed a written contract which 
contained a restrictive covenant not to compete with his employer 
after termination of his employment. The 1959 contract also 
changed the employee's compensation scheme to a $«* 000 salary plus 
a share of the profits. As a result of this new contract, the 
employee's salary increased dramatically. in 1963 the employee 
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earned in excess of $24,000. The employee argued that the 
subsequent written contract adding the restrictive covenant was 
unsupported by consideration, but the court found the modified 
compensation arrangement was consideration for the execution of 
the restrictive covenant. 
In the lower court proceeding in Jacobson the situation 
of a fellow employee, however, presented the precise facts of the 
Gottus case and of the instant case. The restrictive covenant 
there was struck. In distinguishing that ruling from the Jacobson 
case, the Jacobson court stated: 
However, the findings were that Kassn^r was 
permanently hired in February, 1962, under an 
oral contract without a restrictive covenant, and 
in June required to execute a written employment 
contract identical to that under which he had 
been working, except that it contained a 
restrictive covenant. Clearly, here is a case of 
no consideration for the covenant. (Emphasis 
added). 
The present case clearly fits within the rule applied by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gottus, and this court should 
find Lewis1 covenant not to compete void for failure of 
consideration. Schneller v. Hayes, 23 P.2d 272 (Wash. 1934) dealt 
with an almost identical situation. The defendant in that case 
was employed by the plaintiff at the time that he signed the 
agreement. The Supreme Court of Washington held that there was no 
new consideration for the agreement because defendant was already 
employed. 
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The Allen court emphasized in finding sufficient 
consideration, the fact that the pharmacy "was purchasing the 
goodwill which might accrue to the business by reason of the 
plaintiff's personal attributes." The court further emphasized 
the many close friendships that Allen had in the neighborhood, and 
the immediate goodwill which would accrue to the business as a 
result thereof. 
In the instant case, Home had no expectation at the time 
of contracting with Lewis that it was purchasing goodwill which 
might accrue to it because of Lewis' reputation or extraordinary 
skill. Lewis possessed neither the reputation of the pharmacist 
in Allen, nor the extraordinary knowledge and skill possessed by 
the National Sales Manager in System Concepts, both of which 
characteristics presented the immediate prospect of the 
acquisition of goodwill by the employer, just as the sale and 
purchase of an established business presents a likelihood of an 
immediate accrual of goodwill to the purchase. Indeed, in Lewis' 
case, the hiring of an inexperienced employee without any contacts 
in the community wherein the business is located presents no 
prospect of an immediate accrual of goodwill. Thus, the rationale 
applied by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen and System Concepts is 
inapplicable in the instant case. 
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POINT VII 
HOME IS GUILTY OF BAD FAITH, AND, THEREFORE, IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF. 
The Allen test requires that the party seeking to enforce 
a noncompetition covenant not be guilty of bad faith. Under the 
circumstances of the instant casef Home is guilty of conduct that 
not only amounts to bad faith, but also satisfies the elements of 
equitable estoppel. 
In Custom Drapery Company v. Hardwick, 531 S.W.2d 160 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) , a Texas court of appeals held that an 
employer that was guilty of unclean hands due to conduct which 
amounted to his bringing about the breach of contract rather than 
the employee was not entitled to enforce a covenant not to compete 
signed by the employee. The evidence adduced at trial in that 
case indicated that the company substantially reduced benefits to 
the employee and attempted to avoid its obligations altogether in 
certain circumstances. 
I n Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court set 
out the requirements of equitable estoppel as follows: 
Equitable estoppel requires: 
(1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted; 
(2) Action by the other party on the faith of 
such admission, statement or act; and 
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(3) Injury to such other party resulting from 
allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such admission, statement, or act. 
Numerous acts and statements were committed and made by 
Home Abstract and its agents, which were relied upon by defendant 
Lewis in accepting and continuing other employment in competition 
with Home, and which will result in serious injury to Lewis if 
Home were allowed to contradict and repudiate such acts and 
statements. 
Included among those acts and statements are: (1) Home 
Abstract's failure to enforce a similar non-competition covenant 
with Frank Hammond just prior to the time Lewis began working for 
Home, together with Hammond's direct competition with Home since 
his termination; (2) Russell Maughan's statement to Lewis advising 
him that Russell, an officer and director of Home, was seeking 
work elsewhere and suggesting that Lewis do the same, in as much 
as Lewis was employed at Home at a result of Russell's friendship; 
(3) the arrival of other members of the Maughan family as officers 
and directors, thus precluding the ability of Lewis to move up; 
(4) that business was had and Lewis had little future with Home; 
and (5) that the policy of Home was to selectively require the 
execution of a enforcement of the employment contract. 
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POINT VIII 
THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE CONTAINS 
UNREASONABLE TIME AND AREA RESTRICTIONS. 
Standards defining the reasonableness of time and area 
restrictions have typically been determined on an ad_ hoc basis. 
In Allen the Utah Supreme Court expressed its displeasure with a 
five year restriction as follows: "We think that the defendant 
might have made the reasonableness of the restriction more certain 
by prescribing a shorter period of time." However, the court 
upheld the five year restriction in Allen, since the geographical 
restriction encompassed a mere two-mile radius, and the court 
found compelling the reasons to protect the goodwill of the 
business involved. In the instant case, Home has shown no 
entitlement to protection of its goodwill; But, more importantly, 
the geographic restriction found in Lewis1 contract, if upheld, 
will preclude Lewis from pursuing his chosen trade. This is not a 
case of an individual having to move outside a two-mile radius to 
pursue his trade, but includes Weber County and all of the 
counties immediately surrounding Weber County 
The importance of carefully drawn geographical 
restrictions is readily shown by Pancake Realty Co. v. Harbor, 73 
S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1952), cited in System Concepts, where the West 
Virginia Supreme Court held that a one-year convenant not to 
compete was invalid because it failed to include a territorial 
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other political subdivisions, shall not be denied 
or abridged on account of membership or 
nonmembership in any labor union, labor 
organization or any other type of association; 
and further, that the right to live includes the 
right to work. The exercise of the right to work 
must be protected and maintained free from undue 
restraints and coercion, § 34-34-2, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) (Emphasis added). 
Because of the strong public policy favoring the right to work, 
restrictive covenants which would prevent an employee from 
pursuing a similar vocation or trade after termination of 
employment are disfavored by the law, Columbia Ribbon, 369 N.E,2d 
at 6. 
States such as California have declared contracts such as 
this one void. Section 16600 of the Business and Professions Code 
of the State of California provides: 
Every contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or 
business of any kind is, to the extent, void. 
Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnely, Corp., 398 P.2d 147 (Cal. 1965). 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has held that a restrictive covenant 
is not reasonable if it is greater than the restriction required 
for the protection of a person for whose benefit it is imposed or 
if it imposes undue hardships on the person restricted. 
Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d 163 (Hi. 1976); see also, 
Robbins, 645 P.2d at 627. 
-38-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'J I I I " I mi I II I I Il II II Hi II | i i II I  1 I I I I ' ' i t M I t i I I II I I ! 1 I 1 1 in w D i H 
i n H I P " U I . J I I IM^lit In Wmk M i t u l n " ,m<j H I P C a l i f o r n i a s t a 
c l e a r l " f1T7 r i r t f,p u n r e s t r i c t e d r i g h t ol .m p inp lnypp I N um I r 
s u g g e s t s t h a t . i j 11i.1 i 11 ni[ J < i i i i ' i i 11 y *j 1 1 - * i > I , l 1 1 1 1 1 I i i 1 1 I i 11 
contrary t * j;ui i\ - polLcy ct * - t- Srar ,i ~ ran . H J ^ S S 
protect iv i. ecessary t- . . 
tu-.ness causes eiti«r r. ; M employee 1 Tisappropr i at i n ; 
€ . • o e ~ : b%* a ;--
e x t r a o i d i n a i v i^ . , i ? j r i a . . . .* . i ^ : ^ 
b a r ^ ' n ^ s s . umr. h--* , *•-„ M - i t h e r - a n - , l ^ f . p i i • • 
c 
unreasonable u'.vi^ r 1. • «• -iicumsLanceb, •_*- prev- :it 
v^r- '••;.- - .-%?<-.- f - i f •
 : D^r i od of five year? ; 
L J . . , & .- . :J . 
POl N ' X 
THE FINDINGS OF TU:- TMA' COURT ARE SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENT *NP \ 0 " CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
i i e s t a b l i s h e d n» m r j i "p - n a t 
Supreme Cnur ; 
( A . - .ipl*1 t .hose i m d i n g s appea* - • . e a r L ** H? t o »<-.•«,.,, 
JIIL UL Liitr e v i d e n c e , T n ^ ( ' ° '- - >-*" 
w l . t i e t h e t . n i c n c e may ^ r rm . • .
 s . 
d e f e r * t> . • - a l -.*r-. bang v . Cox C o r p . , 6 ^ - P . i n i - i 
-3 9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the instant case, Home's appeal amounts to little more 
than a general challenge to the findings of the trial court. Even 
a cursory reading of the trial transcript and examination of trial 
exhibits shows that little of the critical evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings is in conflict, but, more importantly, 
overwhelmingly supports the findings of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the findings of the trial court challenged by Home 
in this appeal are supported by the weight of the evidence. 
In addition, Home is not entitled to injunctive relief, 
is guilty of bad faith and in violation of public policy as a 
matter of law based upon the facts and circumstances of this case. 
Thus, the findings and conclusions of the trial court are 
not clearly erroneous or contrary to the weight of the evidence 
and must not be disturbed on appeal. I f^S 
Respectfully submitted this / Y day of April, 1985. 
^RAYT^SUINNEY & NEBEKER 
/JAMES Z. DfflpSr 
/ Attorney Aon: Defendant 
0966v 
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